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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§35-l-82.53(2)-86 (1994) and §63-46b-16(1993). 
DL 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the Labor Commission err in ruling that Brett M. Cornaby was in the service of and 
employed by Johnson Brothers Construction when injured? 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Facts Are Not Disputed: Appellants Johnson Brothers Construction 
and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (collectively referred to as "Johnson Brothers") 
have accepted the findings of fact set forth in the Commissions's decision (Attached as 
Appendix A), based upon a 1) failure to challenge these facts in their brief; 2) failure to marshall 
the evidence; and 3) the issue and standard of review presented. The Commission's finding of 
fact are conclusive in this matter. 
2. Sole Issue On Appeal: The Commission concluded that Cornaby was 
employed by Johnson Brothers at the time of his injury and that Johnson Brothers is, therefore, 
liable for his workers' compensation benefits. Whether Cornaby was employed by Johnson 
Brothers or Absolute Minerals & Mining aka Associated Minerals & Mining, who was insured 
by Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company (collectively referred to as "AMMI") at the time 
of his injury depends upon the Commission's application of the terms "employer" and 
"employee" as defined in the Worker' Compensation Act, in light of the relationships between, 
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Cornaby, Johnson Brothers and AMML This is a mixed question of law and fact. 
In Caporoz v. Labor Com'n 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah App. 1997), this Court 
noted that the Commission has been granted, through explicit legislation, broad discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) 
(1994)(repealed effective July 1, 1997) provides: 
The commission has the duty and full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in 
this or any other title or chapter that it administers. 
(Emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should review the Commission's determination that 
Cornaby was employed by Johnson Brothers under a "reasonableness" standard of review. See 
Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 
1991)(cc[A]n agency has abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the context of 
the language and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable."). 
m. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
See Appendix B for the complete text; pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(4)The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by the 
following: 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission - Fees. 
See Appendix M for the complete text pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
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determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter that it administers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid [Renumbered 
effective July 1,1997]. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each 
such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in the case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medications, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen" and "operative defined -
- Mining lessees and sublessees — Corporate officers and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers [Renumbered effective July 1,1997]. 
See Appendix B for the complete text; pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker," and "operative" mean: 
(b) each person in the service of any employer as defined in Section 35-1-42, who 
employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about 
the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not 
including any person whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of the 
trade, business, or occupation of his employer. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed — 
Statutory employers [Renumbered effective July 1,1997]. 
See Appendix B for the complete text; pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public utility and 
each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract or hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, is considered an employer under this title. As used in Subsection (2); 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, 
profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a 
portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent Contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work 
for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to the 
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execution of the work, is not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer 
only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's design. 
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part 
for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, 
and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all 
persons employed by the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, 
are considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of Chapters 1 and 2. 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under Subsection 
(6)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains 
and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 35-
1-4& (Section 35-1-46 requires employers to secure the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits for their employees). 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Johnson Brothers appeals from an Order Granting Motion for Review dated September 
30, 1997 in which the Labor Commission of Utah concluded that Cornaby was employed by 
Johnson Brothers at the time of his industrial accident. The issue in this case is whether the 
Commission erred in concluding that Cornaby was employed by Johnson Brothers, rather than 
AMMI, at the time of his injury. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On June 27, 1996, Cornaby filed two Applications for Hearing for injuries he sustained 
on May 13, 1996 when he fell from a crane platform while removing suspended framing. 
Cornaby claimed that at the time of his injury, he was working for either Johnson Brothers or 
AMMI. In it's Answer, AMMI affirmatively alleged that Cornaby was working as an employee 
for Johnson Brothers at the time of his accident. However, Johnson Brothers, in iVs Answer, 
denied that Cornaby was it's employee at the time of his accident. An evidentiary hearing was 
held before an administrative law judge on January 14, 1997. On March 11, 1997 the 
administrative law judge, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Order. AMMI filed a 
Motion for Review on April 9, 1997 with the Labor Commission, and an Amended Motion for 
Review on April 11, 1997. 
C. Disposition by the Labor Commission 
The Labor Commission, on September 30, 1997, entered an Order granting the Motion 
for Review. The Commission held that at the time of his injury, Cornaby was employed by 
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Johnson Brothers, rather than AMMI. (Appendix A at 3). The Commission specifically 
concluded that Cornaby was hired by Johnson Brothers to perform a specific assignment which 
was an integral part of Johnson Brothers' business. Id On October 29, 1997, Johnson Brothers 
filed a Petition for a Writ of Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On May 13, 1996, Cornaby was in the process of removing some steel framing for 
Johnson Brothers in a building located in Orem, Utah ("the building"), when he fell twenty feet 
from a crane platform. (R. at 180-81). 
2. As a result of the fall, Cornaby sustained injuries to his face and left femur. Jd. 
3. Cornaby's treating physician, C. William Bacon, M.D. documented that Cornaby 
was working for Johnson Brothers at the time of his injury. (R at 48). 
4. A limited liability company, known as "1550 Associates" (1550) owned the 
building where the accident took place. (R. at 256). In anticipation of leasing the building to a 
new tenant, 1550 was under pressure to quickly 1) hire a general contractor to clear out excess 
materials in the building and build a new office structure inside, and 2) find a buyer for a bridge 
crane housed in the building. (R. at 260-61). 
5. 1550 hired Johnson Brothers to clear out and renovate the building. (R. at 264-
65). Part of the renovation of the building included the removal of steel framing inside the 
building. Id 
6. 1550 sold the bridge crane to Lloyd McEwen with the condition that McEwen 
would be responsible for removing the crane. (R. at 260). McEwen hired AMMI to remove the 
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bridge crane and transport it to Payson, Utah. (R. at 325). AMMI's sole purpose for being in the 
building was to remove the bridge crane. (R. at 166, 221-22, 325). 
7. Prior to the accident, Cornaby was in the building to assist with the removal of the 
bridge crane for his employer, AMMI. On Friday, May 10, 1996, Robert Johnson, President of 
Johnson Brothers, noticed Cornaby and a co-worker were using some equipment that would 
work well for some work he needed performed. (R. at 284). 
8. Robert Johnson approached Cornaby and his co-worker, and asked them to 
perform some work for Johnson Brothers. (R. at 171, 281-84). Specifically, Robert Johnson 
asked if they would to straighten a header and remove some suspended steel framing, a job 
completely unrelated to the bridge crane removal. Id. Robert Johnson was not acquainted with 
Cornaby or his co-worker and did not know they were employed by AMMI (Appendix A at 2, R 
at 535-536). 
9. Robert Johnson did not discuss any payment arrangements with Cornaby or his 
co-worker, but recognized that if they charged for the work performed, Johnson Brothers would 
be obligated to pay. Id. 
10. Robert Johnson routinely required proof of workers compensation coverage 
before hiring a subcontractor; he did not ask Cornaby or his co-worker for proof of workers' 
compensation insurance. Id. 
11. At hearing, Robert Johnson testified: "If Fd have possibly hired [Cornaby and 
the co-worker] as employees and if they were working for me, and if I didn't like the way they 
were doing it, then I could have gone in and said don't do it that way, do it another way." (R. at 
286). 12. Cornaby and his co-worker both intended to bill Johnson Brothers for their work 
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as individuals, rather than employees of AMMI (Appendix A at 2, R at 535-36). 
13. Neither Cornaby nor his co-worker had any authority to accept work on behalf of 
AMMI. Id. 
14. On the date of the accident, Cornaby and his co-worker finished removal of the 
bridge crane and loaded it, along with most of AMMI's tools and safety equipment, on AMMI's 
truck. (R. at 147). Before driving the truck to Payson, Dale Snyder, President of AMMI, 
instructed Cornaby "to park the crane truck and take the rest of the day off." Id 
15. Without the knowledge or permission of Dale Snyder, Cornaby proceeded to a 
different part of the building and commenced to straighten the header and remove the suspended 
framing, as Robert Johnson had requested. (R. at 178-81). During the process, Cornaby was 
injured. 
16. Following the accident, Dale Snyder and Cornaby's co-worker returned to the 
building to pick up some additional equipment and noticed that the framing was left in a 
precarious and unsafe position. Acting as a good Samaritan and in an effort to make the area 
safe, they finished removal of the framing. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that Cornaby was outside the course of his 
employment with AMMI at the time of his accident. Under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act, in order to recover benefits, an employee must have been injured by an accident arising out 
of and in the course of his/her employment. Here, Cornaby was not injured within the course of 
his employment with AMMI. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence shows that AMMI and its 
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employees were at the building for one purpose, to remove a bridge crane. When Cornaby 
agreed to perform the extra work for Robert Johnson, he did so for his own benefit, without the 
knowledge or permission of AMMI. Cornaby's job and responsibilities with AMMI related only 
to the removal of the bridge crane, therefore any activity unrelated to that task was outside the 
course of his employment with AMMI. 
Furthermore, application of the "right-of-control" test mandates a conclusion that 
Cornaby was an employee of Johnson Brothers rather than an independent contractor. This four-
part common law test looks to 1) the agreements between the parties concerning the rights of 
direction or control; 2) the business' right to hire or fire the worker without contractual liability; 
3) the method of payment; and, 4) the equipment provided by the employer. These factors are 
used to determine whether a business retains the level of control over its worker necessary to 
establish an employee/employer relationship. As discussed below, Johnson Brothers failed to 
demonstrate that Cornaby was an independent contractor under each factor of the "right-of-
control" test. 
Alternatively, under Utah law, Cornaby was a statutory employee of Johnson Brothers at 
the time of his accident. Under § 35-1-42, all contractors, subcontractors and their employees are 
employees of the original employer, if the employer controls or supervises the contractor's 
work, and the work performed is part or process in the employers trade or business. The purpose 
of this statute is to protect the worker from unscrupulous employers who subcontract out all or 
most of their work in order to avoid paying for workers' compensation coverage. Here, Robert 
Johnson retained a right of control over Cornaby's removal of the steel framing, and such work 
was part and process of the Johnson Brothers' construction business. To hold otherwise would 
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violate the purpose of the statute by allowing Robert Johnson and Johnson Brothers to take 
advantage of an unsophisticated worker and avoid their responsibility to provide workers' 
compensation coverage. 
For the reasons stated above and the analysis below, this court should affirm the Labor 
Commission's decision, holding that Cornaby was an employee of Johnson Brothers at the time 
of his injury. 
vn. 
ARGUMENT 
A. CORNABY'S ACCIDENT DID NOT ARISE OUT OF AND IN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH AMMI. 
Under section 35-1-45 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, in order to qualify for 
workers compensation benefits, an injury must arise "out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment." Utah courts have held that "an accident occurs 'in the course of employment 
when it 'occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to 
do or something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to 
render such service.'" Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997) 
(quoting M & K Corp. V. Industrial Comm'n, 189 P.2d 132, 134 ( Utah 1948)). "Thus, an 
injury occurs 'in the course of employment' when it takes place (1) within the period of 
employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of her 
duties, and (3) while she is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental 
thereto." Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 82 Am. Jur. 
2d, Workers' Compensation § 266 (1992)). 
In Buczvnski this court held that an employee was not entitled to workers' compensation 
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benefits where she failed to meet the necessary elements to show that her injuries occurred 
within the course of her employment. 934 P.2d at 1177-78. The employee in Buczynski. while 
traveling on business, took a side trip to visit friends and socialize. Id at 1170-71. While on the 
side trip, the employee slipped and fell, injuring her knee. Id at 1171. This court determined 
that the employee's side trip "constituted a distinct departure from the business of her 
employer," and therefore, her injuries occurred outside the time, place and purpose of her 
employment. Id at 1177-78. 
Like the employee in Buczynski. at the time of his injury, Cornaby had departed from his 
course of employment with AMMI. The undisputed facts show that at the time of his accident, 
Cornaby was not "rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do . . . at the time 
when and the place where he was authorized to render such service." Neither Cornaby, nor his 
co-worker had been authorized to perform work for Johnson Brothers, nor to use AMMTs 
equipment for such a purpose. Rather, Cornaby had undertaken an endeavor for his own benefit 
and for the benefit of Johnson Brothers. AMMI and its employees were at the building for one 
purpose, to remove a bridge crane. Specifically, McEwen hired AMMI to disassemble, 
remove and transport the crane to its new location in Payson, Utah. Cornaby's job duties and 
responsibilities with AMMI related only to the removal of the bridge crane. Any tasks unrelated 
to the removal of the bridge crane were not furthering the business of AMMI, and were outside 
the course of Cornaby's employment with AMMI. 
Furthermore, Cornaby's injury occurred after he had completed his assigned tasks for 
AMMI, and after AMMI had completed removal of the bridge crane. In fact, Cornaby testified 
that the crane sections had been loaded on the truck before he began his employment duties for 
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Johnson Brothers. Moreover, Cornaby's work for Johnson Brothers took place in a completely 
separate section of the building than the bridge crane removal. 
In summary, the uncontradicted facts show that at the time of the accident, Cornaby's 
was not "rendering service to his employer [AMMI] which he was hired to do . . . at the time 
when and the place where he was authorized to render such service." Thus, the evidence shows 
that Cornaby was acting outside the course of his employment with AMMI at the time of the 
accident. 
B. CORNABY WAS NOT WORKING AS AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR AT THE TIME HE WAS INJURED. 
Johnson Brothers argues that Cornaby was working as an independent contractor at the 
time of his accident. However, the evidence shows that, under Utah law, Cornaby was an 
employee, rather than an independent contractor. Utah Code Ann. 35-l-42(2)(b)(1996) defines 
"independent Contractor" as: 
any person engaged in the performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the 
work, is not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer, is engaged only 
in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the 
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's design. 
In applying this section, Utah courts have stated that "it will almost always follow that if the 
evidence shows that an 'employer' retains the right to control the work of the claimant, the 
claimant is the employer's employee for workmen's compensation purposes." Bennett v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986). As discussed above, the fact that general 
contractors retain the right to supervise and control the ultimate performance of the 
subcontractors satisfies "right to control" requirement. LI at 432. Furthermore, general 
contractors, like Johnson Brothers, are considered statutory employers of their subcontractors 
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under § 35-1-42 (6)(a). See supra Section III. 
Nonetheless, Johnson Brothers argues that Cornaby was an independent contractor, under 
the four factors set forth by Utah courts in determining whether a right to control existed. These 
factors, sometimes referred to as the "right-of-control" test, include: 
(1) whatever covenants or agreements exist concerning the right of direction and 
control over the employee, whether express or implied; (2) the right to hire and 
fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as compared for a 
complete job or project; and (4) the furnishing of equipment. 
Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1995). When applied to the facts of this case, each 
of these factors supports a conclusion that Cornaby was not an independant contractor at the time 
of his injury. 
1. An Implied Agreement Existed, Giving Johnson Brothers the Right to Direct 
and Control Cornaby's Work. 
As discussed above, Robert Johnson retained the right, whether express or implied, to 
supervise and control the ultimate performance of Cornaby. Furthermore, Robert Johnson 
testified that he normally asked for proof of workers compensation insurance before hiring ah 
independent contractor. (R. At 282, 289). However, Robert Johnson did not ask for such proof 
here, indicating that Robert Johnson was hiring Cornaby as an employee and not an independent 
contractor. 
2. Robert Johnson had the Right to Hire and Fire Cornaby at His 
Discretion. 
Generally, a right to hire or fire a worker without contractual liability indicates an 
employee/employer relationship. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 196 P.2d 502, 507 (1948). 
Here, there was no formal contract as one would expect if Cornaby were an independent 
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contractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisbv. 678 P.2d at 305. 308 (Utah 1984). Therefore, 
Johnson Brothers could have fired Cornaby without contractual liability, showing that Cornaby 
was an employee, rather than an independent contractor. 
3. No Method of Payment was Discussed or can be Inferred From Robert 
Johnson's Conversation with Cornaby. 
Robert Johnson and Cornaby never discussed how Cornaby would be paid for the work 
he performed for Johnson Brothers. (R. at 289). Cornaby testified that he planned to approach 
Robert Johnson after the job was complete and request payment. (R at 222). Hence there is no 
basis for Robert Johnson's assumption that Cornaby would "do it as a favor." Cornaby and his 
co-worker both expected to be paid individually, based upon the amount of time the job took to 
complete. Robert Johnson acknowledged that Johnson Brothers would be obligated to pay 
Cornaby. (Appendix A at 2, R at 535-36). The parties expectations regarding payment suggest 
that Cornaby was acting as an employee, rather than an independent contractor. However, the 
absence of a discussion as to the particular method of payment cannot be inferred from the facts 
to support the Johnson Brothers' argument that Cornaby was an independent contractor. 
4. The Fact That Cornaby used AMMI's Equipment While Working for 
AMMI, has no Effect on Cornaby's Employment Status with Johnson 
Brothers. 
This final element assumes that where an employer provides expensive equipment to an 
employee, it is more likely that the employer will want to maintain a high degree of control over 
the employee's work. See Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 49.34 (Lex K. 
Larson ed., vol. IB 1986). While AMMI allowed Cornaby to use its boom truck while removing 
the bridge crane, Cornaby did not have permission or authority to use AMMI's equipment in his 
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work for Johnson Brothers. In fact, Dale Snyder, president of AMMI, specifically instructed 
Cornaby to park the truck and take the rest of the day off. (R. at 147). This fact is not 
challenged or rebutted by Johnson Brothers. Therefore, while this element may be useful in 
showing that Cornaby was an employee for AMMI while he was removing the bridge crane, it 
does not demonstrate that Cornaby was working as an independent contractor for Johnson 
Brothers. 
C. CORNABY WAS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE OF JOHNSON 
BROTHERS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Johnson Brothers argues that Cornaby was working as an independent contractor while 
removing the framing at the building. However, under Utah law, Cornaby was a "statutory 
employee"of Johnson Brothers, making Johnson Brothers liable to Cornaby for workers' 
compensation benefits. Utah Code Ann.§ 35-l-43(l)(b) defines "employee" as every person "in 
the service of an employer as defined in § 35-1-42. The Pinter court interpretting § 35-1-42 (6) 
(a) determine "if an employer hires a contractor, that contractor, his employees, and all 
subcontractors under him are "employees" if (1) the employer controls or supervises the 
contractor's work, and (2) such work is part or process in the employers trade or business." 
Pinter at 307. According to Professor Larson, the purpose of this type of statute is to protect the 
employee by placing the ultimate liability on the principle contractor, who has the power to 
choose subcontractors and ensure that those contractors have appropriate insurance coverage for 
their workers. Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 49.14 (Lex K. Larson ed., vol. 
IB 1986). Another purpose is to "prevent an unscrupulous principal contractor who contracts 
out all or most of his work from avoiding responsibility insuring his subcontractors." Pinter at 
307 (citing Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, supra at § 49.11, 9-14 to 9-16). 
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In Pinter, the Utah Supreme Court applied § 35-1-42 (6)(a) to a case factually similar to 
the one at bar. 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984). In Pinter, a general contractor ("Pinter") contracted to 
build a metal maintenance structure for Heber Power and Light. Id at 306. Because Pinter had 
little experience with metal buildings, it entered into an oral agreement under which Frisby 
agreed to erect the metal portion of the structure. Id Frisby was subsequently injured while 
installing metal siding. Id Both the Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court held that 
Frisby was an employee of Pinter and, therefore was entitled to workers compensation benefits. 
Id 
1. Robert Johnson Brothers Retained Control and Supervision Over the Work 
Which Cornaby was Asked to Perform. 
In determining whether Pinter exercised the requisite degree of control over Frisby, the 
Pinter Court relied, in part, on the fact that Pinter and Frisby's "agreement was oral and 
informal," and the fact that no "evidence was presented that would indicate that [Frisby] was 
held responsible for securing his own compensation coverage." Id at 308. The Court stated that 
the "informality of the arrangement" indicated that Pinter expected to have "sufficient control 
over the work" to ensure that it would meet his specifications, whereas, agreements with 
independent contractors, where the employer expects to have no control, are normally written 
and formal, specifying the exact details of the work to be performed. Id. at 308. 
Like Pinter, Robert Johnson's agreement with Cornaby was oral and informal. Johnson 
Brothers, through its president, Robert Johnson, approached Cornaby and asked him to perform 
the work. Importantly, Robert Johnson did not ask Cornaby or his co-worker for proof of 
workers' compensation coverage (R. at 282, 299), even though he knew that doing so would 
protect Johnson Brothers from workers compensation liability under § 35-1-42 (6)(e)(i) which 
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specifically gives general contractors the opportunity to protect themselves (i.e. by simply asking 
Cornaby for a certificate of insurance and refusing to hire him until one is produced). 
Furthermore, Robert Johnson retained supervision and control over the work which 
Cornaby was asked to perform. This fact is uncontroverted. The Pinter Court stated that "[i]t is 
not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an employer-employee relationship 
exist; it is the right to control that is determinative." 678 P.2d 305, 309 (citations omitted). In 
specifically addressing the nature of the construction industry, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to delegate . . . 
to subcontractors, the general contractor remains responsible for successful 
completion of the entire project and of necessity retains the right to require that 
subcontractors perform according to specifications. The power to supervise or 
control the ultimate performance of the subcontractors satisfies the requirement 
that the general contractor retain supervision or control over the subcontractor. 
Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n. 726 P.2d 427, 432 (Utah 1986). Here, Robert Johnson retained 
supervision and control over the work Cornaby was asked to perform. (R at 286). Johnson told 
Cornaby exactly what tasks needed to be completed and Robert Johnson retained "the power to 
supervise or control the ultimate performance" of the framing removal. Cornaby testified that if 
there was direction given about how the job was to be done, it would have come from Johnson. 
(R at 233). Perhaps the issue regarding supervision and control is best answered by Robert 
Johnson's own admission: "If I'd have possibly hired [Cornaby and his co-worker] as 
employees and if they were working for me, and if I didn't like the way they were doing it, then I 
could have gone in and said don't do it that way, do it another way." (R. at 286). Hence, 
Johnson Brothers' right to supervise and control the ultimate performance of Cornaby's work 
satisfies the "supervision and control" requirement under § 35-1-42 (6)(a). 
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2. The Work Being Performed by Cornaby at the Time of His Injury 
was Part and Process of Johnson Brothers' Trade or Business. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a subcontractors work is "'part and process in 
the trade or business of the employer,' if it is part of the operations which directly relate to the 
successful performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise." Bennett v. Industrial 
Comm'a 726 P.2d at 431. The Court went on to specifically address the construction trade, 
stating, "any portion of the general contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out 
will ordinarily be considered 'part and process in the trade or business' of the general contractor" 
II 
Here, Johnson Brothers' "trade or business" is construction. Specifically, 1550 hired 
Johnson Brothers to renovate the Orem building for a new tenant. This refurbishing project 
included the building of modern office structures and a general clean-out of the building. There 
is no question that the framing removal directly related to the successful performance of the 
work Johnson Brothers had contracted with 1550 to do. Hence, the work Cornaby was 
performing at the time of his injury was part and process of Johnson Brothers' trade or business. 
vm. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case are not in dispute and the Commission's application of these facts 
to the law was reasonable. The Commission concluded that Cornaby was employed by Johnson 
Brothers at the time of his injury. 
Cornaby was not acting within the course of his employment with AMMI at the time of 
the accident. AMMPs sole purpose for being in the building was to dismantel and move a 
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bridge crane. The suspended steel framing that Robert Johnson asked Cornaby to remove was in 
a different part of the building and part of Johnson Brothers' renovation job. 
Cornaby was not working as an independent contractor at the time of his injury. Johnson 
Brothers had the right to direct and control Cornaby's work; Robert Johnson hired Cornaby and 
had the discretion to also fire him; the uncommunicated method of payment does not suggest that 
Cornaby was an independant contractor; and Cornaby was not authorized to use AMMI's 
equipment while working for Johnson Brothers. Under the "right-of-control" test Cornaby was 
not an independant contractor. 
This case mirrors Pinter and Bennett where the Utah Supreme Court held that a general 
contractor is responsible for workers' compensation coverage on its contractors and 
subcontractors. Here, Johnson Brothers, like the general contractors in Pinter and Bennett 
retained the right to supervise and control the ultimate performance of Cornaby's removal of the 
steel framing — work which was part and process of Johnson Brothers' business. Hence, there is 
no question that Johnson Brothers fits the definition of a "statutory employer" set forth in § 35-1-
42(6)(a). 
Nonetheless, Johnson Brothers argues that Cornaby was not their employee, but that he 
remained an employee of AMMI while performing Johnson Brothers' work. Such a conclusion 
violates the policy and purpose behind the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. First, Cornaby 
was not acting within the course of his employment with AMMI, as the Act requires, at the time 
of the accident. Rather, he was acting for Robert Johnson. Second, Robert Johnson should not 
be allowed to shirk his duty to provide workers compensation coverage for his workers. While 
Robert Johnson had the opportunity to ask for proof of insurance, as he normally did when hiring 
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an independent contractor, he failed to do so in this case. To allow Johnson Brothers to profit 
from unsophisticated workers and its own sloppy hiring practices would violate the purpose of 
the statute. 
Based upon the foregoing, AMMI asks this Court to affirm the Labor Commission's 
decision, and hold that Cornaby was an employee of Johnson Brothers at the time of his 
accident. Alternatively, AMMI asks that this Court conclude that Cornaby 1) was not acting 
within the course of his employment with AMMI at the time of his injury; 2) that he was not an 
independent contractor at the time of his injury; and 3) was a statutory employee of Johnson 
Brothers at the time of his injury. Whether this Court affirms the decision of the Commission or 
adopts the arguments made by AMMI, either decision is supported by the law and facts of this 
case. 
DATED OnsD/D day of March, 1998. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
CQM^J) () ruA.Qr^ 
6rad C. Betebenner """ /I ^ 
Carrie T. Taylor ^ 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Absolute Minerals & Mining aka Associated 
Minerals & Mining and Wasatch Crest 
Mutual Insurance Company 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 70^_May of fYiCjr^QvK , 1998, to the 
following: 
Mark Dean 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Johnson Brothers Const, and 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Sherlynn Fenstermaker 
P.O. Box 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorney for Brett Cornaby 
Alan L. Hennebold 
The Labor Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 146600 




UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
BRETT M. CORNABY, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
v. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
ASSOCIATED MINERALS & MINING, * 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL * 
INSURANCE COMPANY, JOHNSON * Case Nos. 96-0607 and 96-0608 
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION and * 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION * 
FUND OF UTAH, * 
Defendants. * 
Associated Minerals & Mining and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Wasatch 
Crest Mutual Insurance Company (referred to jointly as "A.M.M." hereafter), ask the Utah Labor 
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that A.M.M. was Brett M. 
Cornaby's employer at the time of his work accident and is, therefore, liable for benefits due Mr. 
Cornaby under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for-review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
All parties concede that Mr. Cornaby suffered injuries from a work-related accident on May 
13, 1996 and is entitled to the medical and disability benefits provided by Utah's workers' 
compensation system. The only issue in dispute is whether, at the time of his accident, Mr. Cornaby 
was employed by Johnson Brothers, or by A.M.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The accident which caused Mr Cornaby's injuries and gives rise to his claim for workers' 
compensation benefits occurred at a building in Orem, Utah, owned by "1550 Associates". To 
prepare the building for a new tenant, 1550 Associates hired Johnson Brothers Construction to 
refiirbish the building's interior. Among the tasks required was the removal of some steel framing. 
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Also as part of the remodeling project, 1550 Associates sold to Lloyd McEwemi bridge crane 
that was installed in the building. As part of the transaction, Mr. McEwen agreed to dismantle and 
remove the crane. He hired A.M.M. for that purpose. In turn, A.M.M. assigned twojemployees, Mr. 
Comaby and Mr. Stewart, to actually dismantle the crane. A.M.M. also provided a boom truck and 
other equipment necessary for the task. 
At the same time that Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder were removing the crane from the 
building, Robert Johnson, President of Johnson Brothers, was also at the building. Mr. Johnson was 
not acquainted with Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder, nor did he know they were employed by A.M.M. 
Furthermore, neither Mr. Johnson nor Johnson Brothers had any prior business dealings with 
A.M.M. However, it occurred to Mr. Johnson that Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder could use the boom 
truck in their possession to remove the steel framing from the building. 
As Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder were completing their removal of the crane, Mr. Johnson 
approached Mr. Comaby and inquired "who was in charge". Mr. Comaby referred Mr. Johnson to 
Mr. Snyder. Mr. Johnson then asked Mr. Snyder if he and Mr. Comaby would use the boom truck 
to remove the steel framing and perform some other tasks.. Mr. Snyder and Mr. Comaby agreed 
to perform the work, but the men did not discuss any details of the assignment. Mr. Johnson did not 
ask Mr. Snyder or Mr. Comaby for proof of workers' compensation or liability insurance coverage. 
They also failed to establish a price for the work. Mr. Johnson recognized that if Mr. Snyder and Mr. 
Comaby charged for the work, Johnson Brothers would be obligated to pay. Mr. Snyder and Mr. 
Comaby both had the subjective intention to bill Johnson Brothers for their work as individuals, 
rather than as employees of A.M.M. Neither Mr. Snyder nor Mr. Comaby had any authority to 
accept work on behalf of A.M.M. 
Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder proceeded to work on the tasks identified by Mr. Johnson. In 
the course of such work, Mr. Comaby fell and broke his leg. He now claims workers' compensation 
benefits from either A.M.M. or Johnson Brothers, depending upon which entity is found to be his 
employer. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
As noted above, the only issue in this case is the question of whether Mr. Comaby was 
employed by A.M.M. or by Johnson Brothers at the time of his work accident. 
Section 34A-2-104(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines an employee as 
follows: 
. . . each person in the service of an employer,... under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, but not including any person whose employment is casual 
and not in the usual course of trade, business, or occupation of the employee's 
employer. 
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Applying this definition to the facts of this case, the Labor Commission concludes that, at 
the time of Mr. Cornaby's work accident, he was employed by Johnson Brothers, rather than A.M.M. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Labor Commission notes that at the time Mr. Johnson entered 
into his arrangement with Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder, he was unaware of the existence of A.M.M. 
or of any relationship between A.M.M. and Mr. Comaby or Mr. Snyder. Under these circumstances, 
Mr. Johnson cannot reasonably argue that when he asked Mr. Comaby and Mr. Snyder to perform 
the work in question, he was dealing with them as agents of A.M.M. Furthermore, if Mr. Johnson 
had, in fact, intended to hire A.M.M. to perform the work, he would be expected to follow his usual 
practice of requiring proof of liability and workers' compensation insurance. That he did not require 
proof of insurance coverage in this case is additional evidence that he was not dealing with A.M.M., 
but with Mr. Snyder and Mr. Comaby as individuals, hired to perform specific assignments that 
were an integral part of Johnson Brothers' business. 
In light of the foregoing, the Labor Commission concludes that Johnson Brothers was Mr. 
Cornaby's employer at the time of his work accident. Johnson Brothers and its workers' 
compensation carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, are therefore liable for all Mr. 
Cornaby's workers' compensation benefits arising from his work accident. 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that Johnson Brothers Construction or the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah pay to Brett Comaby, in a lump sum, temporary total disability cojppensation at the rate of 
$429 per week for six weeks from May 13 to June 23,1996, for a total sum of $2,574, plus interest 
at 8% per annum from the date each payment was due until the date actually paid. 
It is further ordered that Johnson Brothers Construction or the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah pay to Brett Comaby, in a lump sum, temporary partial disability compensation from June 
24 through October 4,1996 in the amount of $2,288.20, plus interest at 8% per annum from the date 
each payment was due until the date actually paid. 
It is further ordered that Johnson Brothers Construction or the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah pay the medical expenses and mileage for treatment of Brett Comaby for injuries which 
occurred as a result of his work accident on May 13,1996. Such medical expense shall be paid with 
interest of 8% per annum from the date billed, pursuant to §34A-2-420(3) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
It is further ordered that Johnson Brothers Construction or the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah pay to Brett Comaby, in a lump sum, permanent partial disability compensation at a weekly 
rate of $286 for 21.84 weeks, for a total sum of $6,246.24, plus interest at 8% per annum from the 
date each payment was due until the date actually paid. The award of permanent partial disability 
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compensation relates to a 7% whole person impairment suffered by Mr. Cornaby as a Fesult of injury 
to his left leg. 
It is further ordered that Johnson Brothers Construction or the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah pay to Sherlynn Fenstermaker, Mr. Cornaby's attorney, a fee of $2,221.69, plus 20% of 
interest and mileage paid to Mr. Cornaby. This amount paid to Ms. Fenstermaker shall be deducted 
from the sums awarded to Mr. Cornaby by this Order and shall be sent directly to Ms. Fenstermaker. 
It is further ordered that Mr. Cornaby's claim against Associated Minerals & Mining and 
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company for workers' compensation benefits arising from his work 
accident of May 13,1996 is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated thisJjfr day of September, 1997. 
R. Lee fillertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request 
for reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission withinJ20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 
30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of Brett 
M. Comaby, Case No. 96-0607 and 96-0608 was mailed first class postage prepaid this -5o^3ay 
of September, 1997, to the following: 
BRETT M. CORNABY 
8776 SOUTH 420 EAST 
SPANISH FORK, UTAH 84660 
SHERLYNN FENSTERMAKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P O BOX 672 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
BRAD C. BETEBENNER and CARRIE TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS T LAW 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 7TH FLOOR 
P O BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2465 
MARK DEAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157-0929 
ABSOLUTE MINERALS & MINING 
1350 EAST 145 SOUTH 
LEHI, UTAH 84043 
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE COMPANY 
P O BOX 27008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84127 
JOHNSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR 
BOX 1108 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all 
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except 
that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for 
the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute-, 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
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Section 2. Section 35-1-42 is amended to read: 
Utah Code Annot. § 35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — 
Regularly employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state are 
considered employers under this title. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this title prescribed in Sections 
35-1-60 and 35-2-102 . the state is considered to be a single employer and 
includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, 
hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public utility and 
each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written,, is considered an employer under this title. 
As used in Subsection (2): 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, 
business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of 
any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer in 
all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to the routine rule or 
control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or 
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, 
Chapter 59,- 4 -Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is considered the 
employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation benefits 
for them by complying with Subsection 35-1-46 (l)(a)or (b) and commission 
rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a risk showing the leasing company 
as the named insured and each client company as an additional insured by means 
of individual endorsements 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the commission as directed by rule. 
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this title if: 
(i) the employer's employees are all members of the employer's 
immediate family and the employer has a proprietary interest in the farm 
where they work; or 
(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons other than immediate 
family members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 
consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months, 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more than one 
employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under this 
title. 
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not under this title 
has the right and option to come under it by complying with its provisions and the rules of the 
commission. 
(a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in 
part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains 
supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business 
of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all 
subcontractors under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these 
subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer for the 
purposes of Chapters 1 and 2. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or 
remodeling a residence that the person owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
the person's personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer 
solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not be 
considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if the employer who procures 
work to be done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains and relies on 
either; 
(0 a valid certification of the partnership's or sole proprietorship's 
compliance with Section 35-1-46 indicating that the partnership or sole 
proprietorship secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
pursuant to Section 35-1-46 ; or 
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a 
partner of the partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' 
compensation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 
31A-21-104 (8) stating that;(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business; andfB) the partner or owner personally waives the 
partner's or owner's entitlement to the benefits of Chapters 1 and 2 in the 
operation of the partnership or sole proprietorship. 
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an employee 
under Subsection (6)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under 
Subsection 35-1-43 (4). (e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of 
the employer under Subsection(6)(a), if the employer who procures work to be 
done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on either; 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance 
with Section 35-1-46; or 
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship with no 
employees other than a partner of the partnership, officer of the 
corporation, or owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation 
policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31 A-21-104 (8) stating 
that; (A) the partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship is customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or 
business; and (B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner personally 
waives the partner's, corporate officer's, or owner's entitlement to the 
benefits of Chapters 1 and 2 in the operation of the partnership's, 
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise under a contract of hire 
for services. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43. "Employee/5 "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" 
defined — Mining lessees and sublessees - Corporate officers and directors -
Real estate agents and brokers 
[Renumbered effective July 1,1997] 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker," or "workmen," and "operative" 
mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the service of 
the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the state, serving 
the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under any election or 
appointment, or under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, 
including each officer and employee of the state institutions of learning and 
members of the National Guard while on state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 35-1-42, 
who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, 
or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally 
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and 
not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any lessee in 
mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of the lessee shall be covered for 
compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to 
its benefits to the same extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are 
paid employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work. 
(3) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include any partner of the 
partnership or owner of the sole proprietor as an employee of the partnership or sole 
proprietorship under this chapter. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this election, it 
shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be covered. No 
partner of a partnership or owner of a sole proprietorship is considered an employee of their 
partnership or sole proprietorship under this chapter until this notice has been given. For 
premium rate making, the insurance carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole 
proprietor electing coverage to be 100% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(4) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the corporation as an 
employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall serve written notice 
upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or 
officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until notice has been given. 
(5) As used in this chapter,"employee," "worker," or "workmen," and "operative" do not 
include a real estate sales agent or a real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, who 
performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's or associated broker's income 
for services is from real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate sales agent or associated broker are performed 
under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an independent 
contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate sales agent or associated broker is not 
to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(6) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker," or "workmen," and "operative" do 
not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required 
by federal statute or regulation. 
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35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission - Fees. 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter that it administers and 
to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place of employment and to administer 
and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees; 
(b) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and prescribe, modify, and enforce 
reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, and other means or 
methods of protection, to be as nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to carry out all 
laws and lawful orders relative to the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees in employment and places of employment; 
(c) ascertain, fix, and order reasonable standards for the construction, repair, 
and maintenance of places of employment as shall make them safe; 
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of persons, 
employments, and places of employment as necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
title; 
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, medication, and conciliation of disputes 
between employers and employees; 
(f) establish and conduct free employment agencies, and license, supervise, 
and regulate private employment offices, and bring together employers seeking 
employees and working people seeking employment, and make known the opportunities 
for employment in this state; 
(g) collect, collate, and publish statistic and other information relating to 
employees, employers, employments, and places of employment and such other statistics 
as it considers proper; and 
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and rules, prescribe and enforce 
reasonable orders, and take such other actions as may be appropriate for the protection of 
life, health, safety, and welfare of all persons with respect to al prospects, tunnels, pits, 
banks, open cut working, quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and surface 
operations or any other mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer and 
employee exists, but the commission may not assume jurisdiction or authority over 
adopted standards and regulations or perform any mining inspection or enforcement of 
mining rules and regulations so long as Utah's mining operations are governed by federal 
regulations. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the commission may adopt a schedule of 
fees assessed for services provided by the commission. The fee shall be reasonable and fair, and 
shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee established in this manner shall be submitted 
to and approved by the Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. 
The commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without approval by 
the Legislature. Prior to submitting any proposed fee to the Legislature, the commission shall 
conduct a public hearing on the proposed fee. 
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